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BENCH MENO
No. 70-7 5
Moose Lodge No . 107 v. Irvis
Appeal from USDC tvJD Pa (Freedman, Sheridan, Nealon)
The Loyal erder of Hoose has a clause in its charter that
limits membership to white people who are not married to noncaueasians.

In other words neither a black man nor a wh4.te

man who is mar~d to a non-white, may be a member.

At the

time that the events giving rise to this lawsuit took place,
race of/
there was no clause limiting the guests of members,x~xxkex
1:1!

but in practice t:he local lodge in

Harrisburg would not :s:exxx

permit non-whites to be guests of members in the lodge building.
Since that time, the national charter has been ammended to
prohibit members from having non-whites as guests .

:i:Llt

The

i~

369;

----CONTROLLING CASES: Reitman v. Hulkey , 387 U.S.

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715; Shelley
v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1; Evan§_y_._Newton , 382 U.S . 296.
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Pa Liquor Control Board has authority to issue a limited
number of liquor licenses to private clubs so that they can
operate bars for their members.

Only members may buy drinks .

The Board has discretion to issue the license or not, and
it is prevented by local option from

issu~ng

licenses in

To obtain and keep a liquo\i~~cense, a~ applicant

some cities.

must comply with extensive requirements--H~ must make physical
changes in the premises if the Board requires, file a list
of members, conform financial arrangements to statutory requirements,
keep extensive records, prevent persons of il1 repute from
frequenting the premises, not allow lewd or immoral entertainment,
pennit inspection at any time, and in general be a person of
so that
good repute~NXWNNm the issuance of a license will not be
detremental

x~

to the welfare, health, peace, and morals of

the neighborhood.

Among these requirements--set out at length

in appellee's brief at 46-56--is the specific requ~ment that
clubs HN adhere strictly to their charters or constitutions.
It is admitted that this is to prevent

~x~xxx~KR

commercial

establishments from passing themselves off as clubs, but in
this case the requirement means that the Moose must comply with
their racist charter .

At any rate, the Moose do not dispute

that they discriminate ENKNXXN against blacks both as to who
can become a member and as to whom may be a member's guest.
Specifically, this lodge refused to serve a drink to
fl\

Irvis when he was brought to the Harrisburg lodge by a meber
1\

in good standing.

E fact

that Irvis is
Pa and K®NgNg sought the convening of a 3-judge court to
tA
determine whether the state-wide statutory scheme uner which

"'

:.·
~r

t'

··'

•.

-3clubs like the

~loose

with racist membership and guest policies

obtained liquor licenses was state action which deprived blacks
of equal protection of the laws.

The district court found that

-

there was state action, and since the racial discrimination
was undisputed, it

~XN~X~NXKNRxR~~XNXK~

declared the KN lodge's

liquor license to be invalid and directed the board

fx~m

to

It further enjoined the Board from issuing
canceill the license.
-----~
any club liquor licenses to the lodge as long as it followed

....

a policy of racial discrimination in its membership or
operating policies or practices.

~~~x~xi~N

The lodge sought to modify

the decree so that it applied to them only if they discriminated
racially with respect to their operations and not with respect
to membership.

They said that the district court had no

reason to rule on their racist membership policies because
Irvis had not applied for membership and indicated that he had
no intention of applying for membership.
court refused to so modify.
directly.

But the district

The ledge appealed to this Court

The Court has postponed the N determination as to

its jurisdiction over this appeal until the

NR~xi~N

hearing

on the merits.

STANDING ON APPEAL
Appeallants doe not deny that the complaint below was a
proper case for a three-judge court.They argue, however, that
~

there now is no case or controversy beeaoose of the refusal
of Irvis to
decree.

~N

agree to their proposed modification of the

Since Irvis has nox intention, and never had, of

applying for membership, the lodge says that there is no

·.

('~.

;

....

..

I

-4controversy EXR between them and Irvii over their membership
policies.

Thus Irvis shows no damage resulting from those

policies.

Therefore they say the decree below gives Irvis

no relief, that there is no case or controvesry, and that
the case should E therefore be remanded with an order to dismiss
I\

it.ixx:Xx
Irvis's response to this argument is not very satisfying.

f!J;J seems

to say that as a black, he is injured by a 1 iquor

license~.:fo.a club~&

with a racist membership policy.

And that

the discrimination he suffered arose out of these policies.
What appellant is actually trying to argue is that while
Irvis may have had standing to ENXXX!RgN challenge the XEg
lodge's policy KN concerning member's guests, he had no standing
to challenge their membership policies because he did not
seek to join.

Nor did he sue as a taxpayer.

where this gets appellant.

I am not sure

At best, it seems to me that, assuming

that Irvis prevails on the state action question, appellant
would be entitled only to a modification of the decree below
limiting it NK to the operating policies toward guests.
as far as I know,

x~~x

appellant has never

xx:X~xxxx!R

But,

stipulated

that the district court was correct inx N ruling that its
policy toward member's guests was state action in violation of
the equal

~N

protection clauseo

And even if the local lodge

has stipulated that they will now admit blacks if they are
guests of

member~,

the intervening amendment of the national

charter to forbid such a guest policy, would seem to

NNxxxg~

nullify that XN stipulation--particularly since the lodge is
required by regulation to adhere toNi its charter.

Therefcre,

·-

'

..

-5there remains a case or controversy over the mem guest policy
of appellants which Irvis has standing to raise.
As a practical matter, that m throws the merits of
the entire case into the Court's lap.

If the Court rules

that there is state action here because of the involvement
of the liquor board and the issuance of a liquor license,
than the membership policies would soon fall in a lawsuit
brought by a black who had sought membership.
~mixe

'fk

Horeover,

it seems to me that the membership rule and the guest

rule are tied in together.

When Irvis was refused service,

there was no rule that said that blacks could not be the
guests of members.

,.,

That rule existed de facto, however,

because of the mebership rule.
II

It irs: is as if the club had

a rule that ~ that no blacks may be members or the guests
of members.

A black who had been denied either membership

or service as a guest, would seem to have standing to challenge
the entire rule.
If only on the question of its guest policy, however,

will serve all guests of members except those guests who are
non-Caucasian?
STATE ACTION
The 14th Amendment provides that "nor shall any State
• • • deny to any person within its jurisdic·t ion the equal
protection of

xxk the laws.

In the Civil_Rights Cases this

Court held that the Amedmnet prohibited only discrimmnatory

n

:a~x:s:

"acts done under state authority."

This was the begining

.

'

.

'
k

...

..

',

I~.
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of the s~ate action doct ~ine.
Charle ~ Bl!; k

In the fall of xi 1967, &Naxxe~

wf wrote that since 1906, xNxe there had been

~

~

no case in which the Supreme Court has held N that a claim
under the equal protection clause against racial

must fail because
is

aka~~NKXEX

EfxxNexakx~N«~XEf

state

discrimination~\

R«XEXR«XX~Nx

action

Qll! 7

absent or present in insufficient kind or ammount

•

to implicate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.
To my kNEx knowledge, there has been no case since 1967 to
contradict

Rxa«k~

Black 's assertion.

The state action doctrine, therefore, has been developed in
a series of cases which have almost all found that state action

-

did in fact exist.

state action, for the st~ :i::a is almost inevitably involved ~Y-~
~-~
a cer~a in extent? Regret tably perhaps , it turns out that ~

~
. ~~

~~
t;/

~

But when is the involvement of the state,

v -{;

.t\

.r1t

-

there · is no k test, no bright-line rule.
is not a doctrine but a conclusion.
term has avoided all

N~fXN:i::x

In fact, state action

Like poronography, the

attempts at definition.

point is best illustrated by quoting

x~mx

,.,;L,

~~

This

from two &f the

recent state action cases:
"[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition
of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause
is an 'impossible task' which X ' This Court has never
attempted.' • • • Only bY sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed x~ its true
signigiuance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. at 722.
"This Court has never attempted the :i:: 'impossible task'
of formulating an infallible test for determining whether
the State ' in any of its manifestations' has become
significantly involved in private discriminations. ~ENX~
' Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on
( a case-by-case basis can a'non-obviou$ involvement

..

-7-

of the state in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."' Reitman v. Nulkey , 387 U.S. at 378.

-

-

The question, then, is one of degree or "significance".

I

think that there are t'.vo ways to approach the resoluction of
that question in the case before you.
The first, and most obvious, is to look at the xf fact
situations of the cases in which the Court has found state
action to see if there is an anal6gy

or more likely, to

see if there are any cases in which the

xxxx~xx~xx~Nx~xxxx

inv~ement of thex state was less than the involvement here
but in which the Court nevertheress found state action.
If state action has been found in a lesser case, than it
exists here, too.

•

What follows x is a capsule summary of

·the cases.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams,

345 U.S. 461 (1953):

Membership requirements of the Texas

Democratic Party neither authorized nor prohibited by the
state were nevertheless state action.xNE
Evans v. Newton , 382 U.S. 296 (1966): MxxNXXN

,, ,,

was found when

land left in a will for wk the

xx~xxkxx~fxxx~xxk

- -

State action

use as a park by white people only had been maintained by the
city as a trustee.

At the

x~im

time of the suit, the city had

resigned as a trustee of the park,

ENxxxxxx~xx~xi~Nxwxx

rather

than run it on a segregated bas is, but state ac]\ ion was nonetheless
found.

~~

$helly v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1(1948):

pm.ver of a
.tJarsh

Use of the judicial
blacks •
found in the

practices of a company toan--owned and operated by a company and
not

~

incorporated.

''

'!•.
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R

Burton v. Wilmington Parkigg Authori!Y_, 365 ' U.S. 715 (1961).

~1\.x"XXII:KX" The discriminatory practices of a restaurant that leased
~-~

space in a building owned by a state agency constituted state

~~
~..,......-

action.

~

Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964):

park's use of a private, uniformed policeman, who had beed
:&~e

-

A private amusement

deputized by thea state, to enforce is racially discriminatory

practices, constituted state action.
Public Utilities Comm' fl-Y..!_ Pollak,

3t:~3

U.S. 451 (1952):

A monopolisticf bus company, regulated by the state, constituted
2

state action.
Reitman v.

l'lulk~,

387 U.S. 369 (1967):

Repeal of a

state fair housing law by means of a state constitutional
·amemendment providing that the state may not abridge the right
of a~ person to sell or rent to whoever he chooses con~tituted
state action.
~

Amalgamated Food Employees MNixi:x Union Local 590 v.

Logan Valley Plaza:

-

-=

Banning of pickets by means of trespass

law on property of large shopping center serving as a community

business block, freely open to persons passing thooughJwas

state action protected by 14th Amenment.
It is clear to me from all xkix these cases that the eourt
will look to what is actually happening and not to xke form.
Thus, state inaction can be state action in situtaions where
the state tolerates or encourages by its inaction racial
discrimination.

Thus, when Califor~enacted a seemingly

neutral amen~ent ~ to its constitution repealing fair housing
1\

laws, the Court

xa~

saw this as state action authorizing racial

..

j

";.

·,··

-9-

discrimination.

\~en

instead of using its power as a trustee

to end discrimination in a racially discriminatory park the
city

resign~d,

that was state action.

When it permitted a

restaraunt to operate in a state owned EMXX!i:Nx building without
preventing that restaurant from discriminating against blacks,
that was state action.

Regardless of the form it takes, including

inaction, if the state encourages or supports racial discrimination,
there is state action.
~

Permitting

xN~XMMMK~XKMXM~exaxexa

a racist club to have the

benefit of a liquor license in a system of regulation which
would have clearly allowed the state to forbid racial discrimination

-

is also state action.

Indeed, the state in this case has

d etermined that the bigots who run ·the lodge are of "good moral
character" or else they would not have been eligible for a
license,

Furthermore , it requires them to strictly comply

with the membership restrictions of their racist charter.
To test the conclusion that state action is involved here, ask
yourself if the

xxax~

Board could have a regulation that says

"it shall not be a ground for denial of a liquor liences that
a private club does not admit Negores to membersfuip.;f?
submit that the

HNK~x

answer is obviously that such a regulation

would be state action that was prohbited by the 14th
amendment.

I

Reitman v.

Mulk~

am~N~m

would almost certainly control.

But there is no difference in effect between the state's
having such a regulation Mx in writing or having a de facto
policy that

~MN

does the same thinkg,

Pa does have the latter

and therefore is engaged in state action that denies equal
protection of the laws.

';

•'

~

..

-10If you find no sustenance in this conceptual wasteland
hD~

fNx

~

xkllt the kind of case analysis in which I have just

attempted to engage, there is I suggest another approach
)

to this case.

J

Recognizing the intellectual bankruptcy of

state action as a line-drawing mechanism,

xk~xxkxNgx:KNXNNxxxxxx

that there is some state invovlement, and recog-

reco~nizing

nizing that, as a historical fact, state action can

generally~

be found, ask yourself what value there is that needs to be
protected by a finding of no state action.
that

mNKXXN~

Court f rom

~

What is the value

is imporatant enough to prevent the &NNKKXXNKXNN
.

say~ng

t h at t h e

const~tut~on
.
. pro h'~ b'~ts t h ese

~

~,~

~

. P"f"'

rac~stx

JI!X policies?

The brief of appellant supplies us with only one answer:

--

privacy or the right to associate with whom one pleases and
not to associate with those he chooses not lltxg to.
this is a somewhate unusual kind of privacy.

Note , that

We are not concerned

here with what a man does alone, or his right to be left alone,
or his right NN to keep the state from NNXN interfering
with what he does in his own Eef bedroom.

Most of the privacy

arguments advanced in these kinds of cases assume that it is
that kind of priuacy that must be protected and that will be
xkx~ax~lli:Nx

action.

threatened by an expansive interpretation of state

Thus, the horribles that are generally

JI!~X

paraded

before us are requirmng an individual to XNXX invite somewne
to dinner, or in this case, requiring a NNX white man who takes
out a marriage license to marry a black woman.

No one advocates

this; no one is filing lawsuits NX to achieve those ends; and if
someone ever does file such a suit, :Kk~x~ few courts would have

"

-11-

trouble dismissing it out of hand.
Instead what
to

Rxxx appellants talk about is

x:s::s:l8!EXXKRXXNXXXX~!RX~Xl8!N

in large groups .

ffiv.

~

right

:s: be left alone when they assoc.i,ate

I would not deny that there is a legitimate

consideration here, but that consdieration is limited to the
RXKRN~

extent that they involve the state in those groups /

And I think it is legitimate to say that when racial discrimination
is involved, the right of the minority not to have the state
involved in that siscirimination outweighs the right of the
large groups to the privacy of their associations.

Privacy

has never been an absolute right guaranteed under the Constitution;
indeed some, notably Justice Black , never acknowledged the
existance of such a right.

No one denies the right to be

~

free from state involvement in discriminatory practices.
~

xrbn&x.Kx we are not xxx±k talking here about a
with no sta~e involvement
situtation where a truly private group/seeks to exclude blacks.
t~ oever

Nor are we concerned with a situtation in which the state
requires that a private group admit E.KX!R blacks to membership.
We are instead ±Nx concerned with .K the right of a group to

,,

receive from the state a

xxm±xR~

,,

"?

form of largess that only a

l ~ ited ~mbe ~~~ s -may ~ceive.

That largess and the

accompanying __ipu~J@Hln.t of the:s: state brings with it certain
restrictions, among them the
racial discrimination.

xxmx:KR~

prohibition against

If the association does not choose

to accept thos restrictions, it is free to reject or not
request the largesso

But if they recieve the affirmative

support 18!fXKNRX and endorsement of the state--as I think they
do when they get a liquor license--than they may not exercise
the kind of freedom that appellants RRk seek to exercise.

•,

-1-2
Icannot see how the balance between the competing constitutional
values--freedom of

axx~«ixx±~Nxx

privacy in choosing ones associates

and freedom from racial discrimination can be struck

any~

other

way.
X:M:K~xx~xRx

xxx

str~v

There remain a few issues--I would call them

-

men--thrown up by

x~~Rxxxx~~Rxxx

appellants against

the kx possibility of finding state ac·tion in this case.
First , appellants say that if a liquor license means state action,
every x licesne,m!RHK including a building permit, means state
action.

It is obvious that this objection is

a~

phony one insofar

as it applies to the kind of liences, such as a marriage
license

~for

a driver's license, that is open to everyone

who meets certain objective criteria.

There is no state

endorsement or allignment of the state with the persons who
have such a lieense.

And if this case is precdent for finding

state action when other kinds of licenses--the kind that
involve indorsement of someone's moral character, for example
--are issued, so what?

In fact, however, there are few kinds

of licenses that invo~e such pervasive supervision as the
kind of liquor license that appellants obtained from Pa .
Since state action is essentially an ad hoc determination,
distinctions can be made in future cases.
Second., appellan·ts aay that if this xxxN!li ruling applies
to racial restrictions on membership, it will also apply to
religious or ethnic restrictions.
is so what.

Again, the first response

How many protestants do you think would really

try to join the Knights of Columbus?
enlist in the Sons of Italy?

How many WASPs will

But secondly, those kinds of

J,

..

-;,

...

'' '

'

·'

-13k cases, assuming the requisite state involvement, can be
distinguished.

First, because race is different .

We know

that E above all else, the 14th Amenment was designed to
end racial discrimination .
discrimination, but

~Rxk~~x

It may apply to other kinds of
not with the same force as

applies to racial discrimination .

~R~XNX

it

Second , there is

a probable method of distinction suggested in one of the
briefs .

Some kinds of :X membership limitations are reasonably

related to the gNHXXXNX legitimately recognizable goals of
an orga nization .

For example , if the organization is designed

to promote a ceratin religiouls doctrine , it makes sense to
limit membership to persons who have expressed a belief in
that doctrine by joining a church .

But there is no legitimate

purpose in basing mwm membership on raceu

In this connection ,

it is interesting to note that one of the orgainzations
cited by the Elks club in their amicus brief as an organization
with selective membership qualifications , the B'nai B'rith , '
has filed an amicus brief in support of the opinion below
except that it believes that the decision NNKk ought also
apply to

gx~~Mxxgx~~x

groups that discriminate on religious

grounds . (That brfV/f also makes the point that excluding
someone from a men's club may have a substantial impact on
his career if he is a business or professional man . )
Third , appellant asserts that the test applied below
based on the pervasiee nature of the state's involvement
with

XR~±~~ iNRx

unworkable .

recipients of liquor lieenses , is vague and

But as we have x xxaNx already seen , there is no

,'·

.'

'1.
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bright-line test for state action.
Fourth, the argument that a liquor license is not a
privilege granted by the state but a form of control is so
much bull.

The lodge has admitted that it will lose members

and XRXRN!Rlll revenues if it has no license.
argument proves to much.

Moreover, this

The very reason why state action

is involved here while it may not be in other forms of
licensing is that there is such control exercised by the xxxe
state.

:fx It might even be argued that liquor licensees are

so controlled by the state xx that they are the state's agents
for the supervision of liquor control .

And it should be

remembered that substantial revenues result to the state
from the kX use Of these liquor
Rf Fifth ,
a ~xx

XXXXXX~RNXRR

licenses .

Appellants argue that the 1964 Civil Rights

Act somehow forecloses a finding of state action here .

This argument is barely

~N:

coherent .

First , the 1964 Act

was upheld by this Court as x an exercise of the Commerce
Clause , not as an exercise of the Congress ' s
enact laws that enforce the 14th Amenment .

~ex

powere to

Second , Congress

does not claim--which it probably could not do Constitutionally-that it has precisely demarcated the perameters of state action
and when the equal protection clause is to be applied .
The Congress could not enact legislation which would prevent
the Court from ruling under the Constitution that

x~x

something

was state action in violation E of the equal protection clause .
Finally , N the appellants XN argue that even if there is
a finding of state action , the mandate of the district court

,.

-15-

"

is too braod because it need only have struck down the state
regulation requiring private R:l::Na:N clubs to adhere to their
charters.

But it is clear that, on its

objectionable about that regulation.
out for scorn.

fac~,

there is nothing

It cannot be singled

Instead , it is the state involvement and

implied endorsement of a racist organization that calls down
~xNk~R:XiNiN

the equal

protection clause on the Moose's heads

(or perhaps horns).
I do not suppose it would be accurate to say that I have
hidden

~

my feelings on this particular issue.

~

I feel

strongly that it would be a travesty not NX to affirm the
decision below.

I would approach state action,Xk not with

a reluctance to find it and a requirement that the state
XNXNXXRMN~

involvement in a discriminatory practice somehow

surpass a vague measuring line.

Rather , if there is any

state invovlement whatsoever, and if there is racial discrimination, I would find state action unless there was a reason-a R:NNsxXx constitutionally enshrined value--that pointed the
And if such a reason exi~ted, I would then attempt

other way.

to weigh it against the value against racial discrimination, to
which I attach much

wm

weight.

In this case, the

a:xkk~x

alternate value can only be said to be the right to xxx limit

.

.

one's assocLatLons
the state.

~

and~

take advantage of the largess of

That is an extended right which is based only

vaguely in the Bill of Rights in the first place.

I cannot

attach much weight to it.
AFFIR~1
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iE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 20, 1972

Re: No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis and
Liquor Contro 1 Board of Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:
This wi 11 confirm reassignment to you for an
opinion in the above.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

April 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge v. Irvis, I voted to reverse on the
exception of "a private club" made by Congress in the 1964 Act.
On further study I have decided that that ground is not tenable so I am changing my vote to affirm.

·'

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
,,Mr. Justice Brennan
.~~~r. Justice St
M
J
ewart
r. Ustice Whit
.llr J t
e
.ll . us ice Marshall
~ustice Blackmun
· Justice Powell
From: Rehnquist, J.
2nd DRAFT

Circviated:
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
' r

culated:

No. 70-75
Moose Lodge No. 107, On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States District Court for the
v.
Middle District of Pennsylvania.
K. Leroy Irvis et al.
lJune -, 1972]
MR. Jus'l'ICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Appellee Irvis, a N (fgro, was refused service by appellant Moose Lodge, a local branch of the national fraternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
Appellee then brought this action under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
He claimed that because the Pennsylvania liquor board
had issued appellant Moose Lodge a private club license
that authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages on its
premises, the refusal of service to him was "state action"
for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He named both Moose Lodge
and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority as defendants,
seeking injunctive relief that would have required the
defendant liquor board to revoke Moose Lodge's license
so long as it continued its discriminatory practices. Appellee sought no damages.
A three-judge district court, convened at appellee's
request, upheld his contention on the merits, and entered
a decree declaring invalid the liquor license issued to
Moose Lodge "as long as it follows a policy of racial
discrimination in its membership or operating policies

··~
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or practices." Moose Lodge alone a.ppealed from the
decree, and \Ve postponed decision as to jurisdiction until
the hearing on the merits, U. S. - . Appellant
urges in the alterna.tive that we either vacate the judgment below because there is not presently a case or
controversy between the parties, or that we reverse on
the merits.
I

The District Court in its opinion found that "a Caucasian member in good standing brought plaintiff, a
Negro, to the Lodge's dining room and bar as his guest
and requested service of food and beverages. The Lodge
through its employees refused service to plaintiff solely
because he is a Negro." It is undisputed that each
local Moose Lodge is bound by the constitution and
general by-laws of the Supreme Lodge, the latter of which
contains a provision limiting membership in the lodges
to white male Caucasians. The District Court in this
connection found that "the lodges accordingly maintain
a policy and practice of restricting membership to the
Caucasian race and permitting members to bring only
Caucasian guests on lodge premises, particularly to tho
dining room and bar."
The District Court ruled in favor of appellee on his
Fourteenth Amendment claim, and entered the previously described decree. Following its loss on the merits
in the District Court, Moose Lodge moved to modify
the final decree by limiting its eft"ect to discriminatory
policies with respect to the service of guests. Appellee
opposed the proposed modification, and the court denied
the motion.
The District Court did not find, and it could not have
found on this record, that appellee had sought membership in Moose Lodge and been denied it. Appellant

.,
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contends that because of this fact, appellee had no
standing to litigate the constitutional issue respecting
Moose Lodge's membership requirements, and that therefore the decree of the court below erred insofar as it
decided that issue.
Any injury to appellee from the conduct of Moose
Lodge stemmed not from the lodge's membership requirements, but from its policies with respect to the
serving of guests of members. Appellee has standing
to seek redress for injuries done to him, but may not seek
redress for injuries clone to others. Yirginian Railway v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 558 (1937); Erie
Railroad Co. v. ·w illiams, 233 U. S. 685, 697. While
this Court has held that in exceptiona1 situations a
concededly injured party may rely on the constitutional
rights of a third party in obtaining relief, Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953), 1 in this case appelleewas not inj urecl by Moose Lodge's membership policy
since he never sought to become a member.
Appellee relics on Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968),
·and Law St'Udents Research Co'Undl v. Wadmond, 401
U. S. 154 ( 1971), to support the breadth of the District
Court's decree. Flast v. Cohen held that a fcdera1 taxpayer had standing qua taxpayer to challenge the expenditure of federal funds authorized by Congress under
the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution.
The Court in Flast pointed out:
"It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental
expenditure of tax funds in the administration of
an essentially regulatory statute. This require1
Our reeent opinion in 8ien·a Club v. 111m·ton,- U. S. - , referred to a similar rrla1ionship betwren the standing of the plaintiff
and the argument of which he might aYail himself where judicia!
reviev> of agrnry ar1ion i~ sou~~:ht. - U . S . - , at-.

'·
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mentis consistent with the limitation imposed upon
State-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Dore?nus
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952)." 392
U. S., at 102.
The taxpayer's claim in Flast, of course, 1ras that the
proposed expenditure violated the establishment clause
of the First Amendment to the Constitution, a clause
which by its terms prohibits taxing and spending in aid
of religion.
The Court in Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, noted that while appellants admitted that
no person involved in that litigation had been refused
admission to the New York bar, they claimed that the
existence of Now York's system of screening applicants
for admission to the bar \vorked a chilling effect upon
the free exercise of the rights of speech and association
of students who must anticipate having to meet its
requirements. The Court then went on to decide the
merits of the students' contention. While the doctrine
of "overbreadth" has been held by this Court in prior
decisions to accord standing by reason of the "chilling
effect" that a particular law might have upon the exercise of the First Amendment rights, that doctrine has
not been applied to constitutional litigation in areas
other than those relating to the First Amendment.
We believe that Moose Lodge is correct, therefore, in
contending that the District Court in its decree went
beyond the vindication of any claim that appellee had
standing to litigate. Appellee did, however, have standing to litigate the constitutional validity of Moose
Lodge's policies relating to the service of guests of members. The language of the decree, insofar as it referred
to Moose Lodge's "policy of racial discrimination against
membership or operating policies or practices" is sufficiently broad to encompass practices relating to the

l
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service of guests of mem.bers, as well as policies and
practices relating to the acceptance of members. But
Moose Lodge claims that, because of the position appellee took on the motion to modify the decree, he in effect
disclaimed any interest in obtaining relief based solely
on the Lodge's practice with respect to serving the guests
of members.
Appellee in his brief on this point says:
"[Moose Lodge's argument as to mootness] is based
upon Moose Lodge's motion to modify the decree ...
and somehow to allow it to change its operations
and to permit Irvis to be brought to the Moose·
Lodge's premises as a guest. But, as Irvis pointed
out in his answer to this motion . . . nothing at
all "·oulcl be changed even if this were done because
the vice of racial discrimination arose from the
privileges of membership, either those accruing to
a person in his own enjoyment of them or those
accruing to a person in his ability to bring a guest
or guests to Moose Lodge. Nothing in the suggested modification would make repetition impossible because the fact that Irvis was a guest was
purely happenstance. Whether he be barred because no member would invite him or because he
has no opportunity to become a member, the situation remains unchanged." (Brief, at 41.)
During oral argument of the case here, counsel forappellee was asked to explain why he opposed the motion to modify made in the lower court, and he responded
as follows:
" ... the motion to modify which would have allmved Mr. Irvis or any others to be admitted as a
guest would have done nothing to remove the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from the discriminatory
actions of the Moose Lodge.

,. . ',
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"That is, it still would have been a matter of
being dependent upon a white member of the Moose
Lodge to invite him there. It would have been
a matter of no particular Negro being sure that
the Moose Lodge \Yould or would not discriminate.
The Commonweath of Pennsylvania would still be
issuing that license to a discriminating private rlub.
And I think it's worth noting that at the time this
motion to modify ,,·as being presented, the Moose
Lodge was in the process of amending its by-laws
to forbid Negroes from being guests. So, at the
same time they were sayi11g let us modify the decree
so that we can admit Mr. Irvis as a guest, their
by-laws were being amended to say no Negroes can
come in as guests, let alone members.
"We feel that the idea that he should then be
allowed to come in as a guest through a mo<..lification of the decree does not go to the heart of the
problem. It does not supply the type of redress
that we think cuts through the problem of State
participation or support for the discrimination of
the Moose Lodge, and that is why '"e oppose it."
We arc loath to attach conclusive weight to the relatively spontaneous responses of counsel to equally spontaneous questioning from thr Court during oral argument. However, upon examination of this ans",;er
it reflects substantia.lly the same position as appellee
took in his brief here. While it is possible to i11fer
from these statements that appellee is simply not interested in obtaining any relief as to guest practices of
Moose Lodge if he should prevail on the merits, it is
equally possible to read them as being tactical arguments designed to avoid having to settle for half a loaf
when he might obtain the whole loaf.
The mere refusal by appellee to consent to the proposed amendment of the judgment by itself could not
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be construed as a waiver or disclaimer of injunctive relief directed solely to Moose Lodge's practice with respect to the service of guests. Appellee's complaint,
while directed primarily at membership policies of Moose
Lodge, con taincd a customary prayer for other relief
which was broad enough to embrace relief with respect
to the practices of the lodge in serving guests of members. The District Court in its decree used language
that was clearly broad enough to include such practices. as well as the membership policies of Moo c Lodge.
Having thus prayed for such relief in his complaint,
and having obtained it from the District Court, nothing
less than an explicit renunciation of a.ny claim or desire
for such relief here would justify our concluding that
there was no longer a case or controversy with respect
to Moose Lodge's practices in serving guests of members. We do not believe that a fair reading of appellee's
argument in opposition to the motion to amend the
judgment belo'"' or of the statements made in his brief
and oral argument here, amount to such an explicit
renunciation.
Because appellee had no standing to litigate a constitutional claim arising out of Moose Lodge's membership practices, the District Court erred in reaching that
issue on the merits. But it did not err in reaching the
constitutional claim of appellee that Moose Lodge's guest
service practices under these circumstances violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in the positions taken
by the parties since the entry of the District Court
decree has mooted that claim, and we therefore turn
to its disposition.
II
Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of that term. It is a local chapter of a national
fraternal organization having \rell defined requirements
for membership. It conducts all of its activities in a

-··
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building that is owned by it. It is not publicly funned.
Only members and guests are permitted in any lodge
of the order; one may become a guest only by invitation of a member or upon invitation of the house
committee.
Appellee, while conceding the right of private clubs
to choose members upon a discriminatory basis, asserts
that the licensing of Moose Lodge to serve liquor by
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board amounts to such
State involvement with the club's activities as to make
its discriminatory practices forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
relief sought and obtained by appellee in the District
Court was an injunction forbidding the licensing by
the liquor authority of Moose Lodge until it ceased
its discriminatory practies. We conclude that Moose
Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to a guest
by reason of the fact that he was a Negro does not,
under the circumstances here presented, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1883, this Court in The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U. S. 3, set forth the essential dichotomy between discriminatory action by the State, which is prohibited
by the Equal Protection Clause, and private conduct,
"however discriminatory or wrongful," against which
that clause "erects no shield," Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U. S. 1, 13 (1948). That dichotomy has been subsequently reaffirmed in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715
(1951).
While the principle is easily stated, the question of
whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on
the one hand, or amounts to "State action," on the other
hand, frequently admits of no easy answer. "Only by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
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be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra., at 772.
Our cases make clear that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State
if it is state actio11 that enforces privately originated
discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra. The Court
held in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra,..
that a private restaurant owner who refused service because of a customer's race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, where the restaurant was located in a
building owned by a state created parking authority
and leased from the authority. The Court, after a comprehensive review of the relationship between the lessee·
and the parking authority concluded that the latter had
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle [the restaurant owner] that it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered
to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the·
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 365 U.S., at 725.
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative
of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity
receiVes any sort of benefit or service at all from the
State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree
whatever. Since state-furnished services include such
necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire
protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the
distinction between private a.s distinguished from State
conduct set forth in The Civil Rights Cases, supra, and
adhered to in subsequent decisions. Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is
private, the State must have "significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations," Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U. S. 369, 380 ( 1967), in order for the discriminatory
action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional
prohibition.

·.
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Our prior decisions dealing ",:ith discriminatory refusal of service in public eating places are siguificantly
different factually from the case now before us. PetersonY. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1063), dealt with
trespass prosecution of persons \Yho "sat in" at a restaurant to protest its refusal of service to ~egroes. There
the Court held that although the ostensible initiative
for the trespass prosecution came from the proprietor,
the existence of a local ordinance requiring segregation of races in such places was tantamount to the State
having "commanded a particular result," 373 U. S., at
248. \Vith one exception, which is discussed h1jra, at
13-15, there is no suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations governing the sale of
liquor arc intended either overtly or coYertly to encourage discrimination.
In Burton, supra, the Court's full discussion of the
facts in its opinion indicates the significant differences
between that case and this:
"The land and building were publicly owned. As
an entity, the building was dedicated to 'public
uses' in performance of the Authority's 't>sscntial
governmental functions.' rcitation omitted.l The
costs of land acquisition, construction. and maintenance arc defrayed entirely from donations by the
City of \rilmington, from loans and rrvenue bonds
and from the proceeds of rentals and parking srrvicrs out of which the loans and bonds were payable.
Assuming that the distinction would be significant
[citation omittedj the commercially leased areas \Yere
not surplus state property, but constituted a physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispens~
able part of the State's plan to operate its project
as a self-sustaining unit. Upkeep and maintenance
of the building, including necessary repa.irs, "·ere
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responsibilities of the Authority and \\·ere payable
out of public funds. It cannot be doubted that the
peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility in ,,·hich it is located confers on each
an incidental variety of mutual benefits. Guests of
the restaurant arc afforded a convenient place to
park their automobiles, even if they cannot enter
the restaurant directly from the parking area. Similarly, its convenience for diners may well provide
additional demand for the Authority's parking facilities. Should any im provemcnts effected in the
leasehold by Eagle become part of the realty, there
is no possibility of increased taxes being passed on
to it since the fcc is held by a tax exempt government agency. Neither can it be ignored, especially
in view of Eagle's affirmative allegation that for it
to serve Negroes would injure its business, that
profits earned by discrimination not only contribute
to, but also arc indispensable clements in, the financial success of a government agency." 365
U. S., at 723-724.
Here there is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in
Burton, where the private lessee obtained the benefit
of locating in a building owned by the State created parking authority, and the parki11g authority was enabled to
carry out its ])l'imary public purpose of furnishing parking space by advantageously leasing portions of the
building constructed for that purpose to commercial
lessees such as the owner of the Eagle Restaurant. Unlike Burtun, the Moose Lodge building is located on land
owned by it, not by any public authority. Far from
apparently holding itself out as a place of public accommodation, Moose Lodge quite ostentatiously pro-

,
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claims the fact that it is not open to the public at large.?
Nor is it located and operated in such surroundings
that although private in name, it discharges a function
or performs a service that would othenvise in all likelihood be performed by the State. In short, while Eagle
"·as a public restaurant in a public building, Moose
Lodge is a private social club in a private building.
With the exception hereafter noted, the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of
the club which it licenses to serve liquor. There is no
suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania Act,
either as written or as applied, discriminates against
minority groups either in their right to apply for club
licenses themselves or in their right to purchase and be
served liquor in places of public accommodation. The
only effect that the state licensing of Moose Lodge to
serve liquor can be said to have on the right of any other
Pennsylvanian to buy or be served liquor on premises
other than those of Moose Lodge is that for some purposes club licenses are counted in the maximum number
of licenses which may be issued in a given municipality.
Basically each municipality has a quota of one retail
license for each 1,500 inhabitants. Licenses issued to
hotels, municipal golf courses and airport restaurants
are not counted in this quota, nor are club licenses until
the maximum number of retail licenses is reached. Beyond that point, neither additional retail licenses nor
additional club licenses may be issued so long as the
number of issued and outstanding retail licenses remains above the statutory maximum.
~The Pennsyh·rrnia courts have found that Lora! 107 i~ not a
"place of public accommodation" within the term~ of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 951 ct seq.
Pennsylvania IIwnan Relations Commission Y. 'The Loyal Order of
Moose, Lodge No. 107,- Pa. D&C 2d - , aff'cl,- Pa. Ruper. - .
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The District Court was at pains to point out in its
opinion what it considered to be the "pervasive" nature
of the regulation of private clubs by tho Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board. As that court noted, an applicant for a club license must make such physical alterations in its premises as the board may require, must
file a list of the names and addresses of its members and
employees, and must keep extensive financial records~
The board is granted the right to inspect the licensed
premises at any time when patrons, guests or members
are present.
However detailed this type of regulation may be in
some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster
or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said
to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even
a joint venturer in the club's enterprise. The limited
effect of the prohibition against obtaining additional
club licenses when the maximum number of retail licenses allotted to a municipality has been issued, when
considered together with the availability of liquor front
hotel, restaurant, and retail licensees falls far short of
conferring upon club licensees a monopoly in the dispensing of liquor in any given municipality or in the
State as a whole. We therefore hold that, with the
exception hereafter noted, the operation of the regulatory
scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board does not sufficiently implicate the State in the
discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge so as to
make the latter "State action" within the ambit of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court found that the regulations of the
Liquor Control Board adopted pursuant to statute affirmatively require that "every club licensee shall adhere
to all the provisions of its constitution and by-laws." 3
Regulations of i.hc Pcnnsyh·ania Liquor Control Board § 113.09•
(June 1970 ed.) .
3

•'
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Appellant argues that the purpose of this provision "is
purely and simply and plainly the prevention of subterfuge," pointing out that the bona fides of a private
club, as opposed to a place of public accommodation
masquerading as a private club, is a matter with which
the State Liquor Control Board may legitimately concern
itself. Appellee concedes this to be the case, and expresses disagreement with the District Court on this
point. There can be no doubt that the label "private
club" can and has been used to evade both regulations
of State and local liquor authorities, and statutes requiring places of public accommodation to serve all
persons without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. This Court in Dam'el v. Paul, 395 U. S.
298 (1969), had occasion to address this issue in connection with the application of Title IT of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq.
The effect of this particular regulation on Moose Lodge
under the provisions of the constitution placed in the
record in the court below would be to place State sanctions behind its discriminatory membership rules, but not
behind its guest practices, which were not embodied in
the constitution of the lodge. Had there been no change
in the relevant circumstances since the making of the
record in the District Court, our· holding in Part I of this
opinion that appellee has standing to challenge only the
guest practices of Moose Lodge would have a bearing on
our disposition of this issue. Appellee stated upon oral
argument, though, and Moose Lodge conceded in its
Brief • that the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge have been
altered since the lower court decision to make applicable
to guests the same sort of racial restrictions as are presently applicable to members. 5
.tAt p. 10.
5 Section 92.1 of the General Law~ of the Loyal Order of l\Ioose
presently provides in relevant part as follows:
"Sec. 92.1-To Prevent Admission of Non Members-There shall

.. .
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Even though the Liquor Control Board regulation in
question is neutral in its terms, the result of its application in a case where the constitution and by-laws of a
club required racial discrimination would be to invoke
the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule. State action, for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause, may emanate from rulings
of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from
legislative or judicial action. Robinson v. Florida, 378
U.S. 153, 156 (1964). Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, makes
it clear that the application of state sanctions to enforce
such a rule ·would violate the }-,ourteenth Amendment.
Although the record before us is not as clear as one would
like, appellant has not persuaded us that the District
Court should have denied any and all relief.
Appellee was entitled to a decree enjoining the enforcement of § 113.09 of the regulations promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board insofar as that regulation requires compliance by Moose Lodge with provisions of its constitution and by-laws containing racially
discriminatory provisions. He was entitled to no more.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
cause remanded with instructions to enter a decree in
conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

never at any time be admitted to any soci::tl club or home maintained
or operated by any lodge, any person who is not a member of some
lodge in good standing. The House Committee may grant guest
privileges to persons who are eligible for membership in the fraternity
consistent with governmental laws and regulations. A member shall
accompany such gueHt and shall be responsible for the actions of said
f!Uest, and upon the member leaving, the guest must also leave. It
is the duty of each member of the Order when so requested to submit for inspection his receipt for dues to any member of any House
Committee or its authorized employee."

!
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6/2/72
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL
Re: No. 70-75, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
Justice Rehnquist has circulated in this
know I disagree with the result, but I think he has done a
good job.

He says that appellee had no standing to challenge

the membership rules of appellant because he never applied
for membership and indicated that he never intended to do so.
He does have standing to challenge the guest policies.
These are upheld because of an absence of state action.
State action is said to be state enforcement of dsicrimination
or state involvement in a discriminatory scheme, even though
the state itself does not initiate the discrimination.

This

is all said to be a matter of degree, and Justice Rehnquist
concludes that the state involvement in this scheme was not
sufficient to constitute state action.

He does think that

the state liquor board can be enjoined from enforcing its
regulation requiring licensees to comply with their constitutions
if the constitutions contain discriminatory policies because
that is state enforcement of private discrimination which has
been condemned since the case of Shelly v. Kramer.
The approach is, it seems to me, correct given the
past precedents of this Court.
in this factual setting.

I only disagree with application

It seems to me that the state involvement

through a complex x«eme scheme of regulation of liquor licensees
is equal to its involvement in the Wilmington Parking AuthQ£ity
case in which the state leased space in a state building to
a restaurant that discriminated.

My approach is that given
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the fact that the existence of state action turns on a matter
of degree and given that there is some state involvement,

an

examination should be made to see if there are any countervailing constitutional values that would argue against a
finding of state action.

In this case, the only such values

asserted is the right of association, but surely that value
is upheld by permitting persons to choose on an individual
basis with whom to associate without discriminating against
an entire class of people for irrational reasons.

This seems

to me to be particularly true when the class is blacks whose
protection against discrimination is particularly enshrined
in the Constitution.

This is not at all analagous to the

case of groups organized to promote various religious or
political principles who admit as members only those persons
who also adhere to those principals.

That it seems to me

is a rational classification which does not violate the
equal protection clause.
Jl assume, however, that you do not agree with that

analysis.
any qualms.

I think you can join Justice Rehnquist without
His opinion is good, albeit to my way of

thinking tragic.
Fox
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CHAMBERS O F

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 2, 1972

70-75 -

Moo ;~G

Lodge v Irvis et al.
0

Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case. Although the opinion
probably makes it clear enough already, I
wonder whether it might not be a good idea,
in this Sf'nsitive area, to emphasize explicitly that n ither the State nor any of its
agencies has in any way approved, endorsed,
accepted, or supported the racially discriminatory constitution, by-laws, or practices
of the appellant Compare Public Utilities
Commiss ion v. Pollak, 343 U S. 451, at
462.
0

0

Sincerely yours,

\~~:
Mr Justice Rehnquist
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Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 5, 1972

Re:

No. 70-75 -Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis

,·,

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

June 7, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis

.·
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

t~

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 8, 1972

Re: No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
~egards,

1
Lu~ )
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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HARRY A. BLACKMUN

...

June 8, 1972

I

l'
Re:

No. 70-75

Moose

Lodg~-

No. 107 v. Irvis

,.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.

,.

~·

Sincerely,

;! [i.6
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc:

The Conference
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